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94 To EVERYONE AN ANSWER 
Who is the designer? As a Christian I hold that the Christian God is 
the ultimate source of design behind the universe (though that leaves 
open that God works through secondaty causes, including derived intel-
ligences such as angels or teleological processes). But there's no way for 
design inferences based on features of the natural world to reach that 
conclusion. Design inferred from complex specified information in na-
ture is compatible with Christian belief but does not entail it. This is as 
it should be. Nature is silent about the revelation of Christ in Scripture'. 
At the same time, nothing prevents nature from independently testifying 
to the God revealed in the Scripture. The complex specified information 
exhibited in natural phenomena is perhaps best thought of as God's fin-
gerprints. Fingerprints never tell us the character of the one whose fin-
gers are in question. But they can tell us that we are dealing with the 
fingers of an intelligence, and this in turn can lead us to inquire into the 
character of that intelligence. An information-theoretic design argument 
therefore doesn't so much lead us to God as remove us from paths that 
lead away from God. 
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THE TERM "COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT" (HEREAFTER CA) REFERS TO A WHOLE 
class of arguments or patterns of thinking that have in common the con-
clusion that God is real because the things we see around us never exist 
unless sometl1ing makes them exist. So, roughly, the CA concludes to 
God as a first cause or initiating source of things because there cannot 
be an infinite sequence of causes of the existence of the things around 
us, those things that we observe as existing only because they are caused 
to do so. 
We can distinguish types of the CA in several ways. First, most have 
been based on observations of the real world. Some, however, have 
been argued strictly on the basis of what is logically possible and neces-
sary (see below). 
A second critical distinction is between arguments that imply that God 
is chronologically first in time versus those that conclude to a God as the 
first cause in a concurrent sequence of dependent causes, all at the same 
time. A third distinction is between those arguments that refer to the 
whole universe as a single dependent object and those that refer only to 
individual causal chains as the basis for needing a first cause. 
Fourth, some arguments attempt to conclude to a full-blown concept 
of God. This demands a rather complex argument. By contrast, many 
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rather simple arguments arrive at the minimal conclusion of a first cause. 
They will then add supplemental arguments that provide a fuller conclu-
sion as to the nature of this cause. 
This chapter is concerned with the classic form of the CA, first fully 
stated by Aristotle and best known as developed by Thomas Aquinas. 
We will begin with a historical overview. 
A LITTLE HISTORY 
Looking at the development of Greek philosophy, we see a step-by-step 
unfolding of an argument delineating the source of the universe. What 
drives it is the recognition of change, motion, the combining and recom-
bining of chemical elements, that is, the dependency of things on an or-
ganizing, designing and driving cause. In Heraclitus it is a logos or law-
fulness; in Anaxagoras it has become Mind. 
The first time, however, that this becomes a real argument for an ac-
tual agent is in Plato. In his Phaedrus and in Laws, we have the key el-
ements of the CA: (1) the things we observe are arranged in sequences 
of causes and effects; (2) such sequences cannot go on endlessly; and 
(3) the beginning point, or initiating cause, will be different from the 
other causes in not being caused by something else. For Plato it is Soul. 
Aristotle, Plato's student, carefully refines this argument into its stan-
dard format in his Metaphysics. He has a clearer concept of "infinite" and 
provides a subargument as to precisely why there cannot be an infinite 
sequence of causes of dependent things. He also provides some impli-
cations about the nature of this first cause that follow just because it can-
not itself be caused but is precisely uncaused. 
Little knowledge of Aristotle is preserved for Roman and early Chris-
tian Europe. It is, however, maintained in Arab culture and is central in 
the development of Islamic philosophy. The version of the CA put for-
ward by al-Ghazali, Ibn Rushd and others understands the sequence of 
causes as a chronological argument for a first cause of the universe back-
wards in time. This CA has come to be known as the kalam argument 
and is the subject of another chapter. 
By the twelfth centllly, Aristotle's Metaphysics had been brought to 
Europe by way of the Muslim conquest of Spain. Enter Thomas Aquinas. 
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What is most significant is his development of the argument within the 
context of Christian theology. In the Summa T7Jeologica and in the 
Summa Contra Gentiles he gives five brief statements of the CA that 
have come to be known as the Five Ways, though they are not the same 
in each book. 
Following Thomas, the CA develops in a number of different direc-
tions. One is initiated by Duns Scotus. What he does is preface each 
premise of the CA with "it is possible." The conclusion then is that it is 
possible that an uncaused first cause exists. This is a quite different ar-
gument in that it proceeds solely on the basis of what is logically possi-
ble. Scotus argues that if an uncaused being is possible, then it is actual, 
since nothing could limit its being. There are contemporalY versions of 
this form found in the work of James Ross and others.1 
By far the most important direction taken by the CA comes in the 
eighteenth century at the hands of G. W. F. Leibniz and Samuel Clarke. 
The notable addition to the CA is what Leibniz calls the principle of suf-
ficient reason: nothing happens or exists without a reason. This trans-
forms tl1e CA into a significantly different argument. First, it is now an 
argument about the reason for the entire universe rather than its cause. 
Second, it concludes to a God whose existence is necessalY, that is, who 
exists in such a way that it makes no sense to ask the reason for the nec-
essaly being's existence. 
It is precisely this second point that forms the basis for an attack by 
Immanuel Kant in his Critique oj Pure Reason (781). He holds that the 
velY concept of a necessarily existing being is incoherent. The debate 
over Kant's criticism continues, but its effect on the entire discussion of 
the CA in the nineteenth century was devastating, even though Kant's 
criticism only affects Leibniz's version of the CA. 
A renewed discussion begins in the 1960s as a result of the work of 
Bruce Reichenbach, William Rowe and others.2 Since then, the volume 
lSee James Ross, Philosophical Ibeology (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1969). 
'See Bruce Reichenbach, T7Je Cosmological Argument: A Reassessment (Springfield, III.: Charles 
Thomas Press, 1972), and William Rowe, T7Je Cosmological Argument (New York: Fordham 
University Press, 1998). The latter is an excellent source on the entire histOlY of the Leibnizian 
argument. First published in 1975, this new edition keeps the discussion current. 
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of published literature on this form of the CA and the principle of suffi-
cient reason has exploded. 
Another direction is taken by a tradition of late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centmy philosophers known as Personalists. They actually 
combined the CA with the teleological argument. Peter Bertocci, for ex-
ample, argued that in fact there must be a self-sufficient source of our 
universe and that what directs our search is its design. We must conclude 
that there is a self-sufficient designing intelligence/creator of the uni-
verse. What was important to Bertocci and is to current philosophers like 
Richard Gale, who uses a similar approach, is that this argument de-
mands only a finitely intelligent God, which provides them an answer to 
the vexing problem of evi1.3 
These three lines of development should not cloud the fact that the 
standard CA itself continues to be developed following Thomas. This 
process comes to an almost virtual standstill with the apparently success-
ful critique leveled by Kant. 
A renewed interest begins with the pronouncement of Vatican I, 
which directed Catholic philosophers and theologians to resume the 
study of Thomas Aquinas. This brought about a renewed discussion and 
appreciation of the CA in the early twentieth centmy. Catholic philoso-
phers like Etienne Gilson and Jacques Maritain were crucial here. Within 
broader philosophical circles, and particularly among evangelicals, this 
renewal of interest in Thomas's CA had to wait until the 1960s and the 
work of Norman Geisler and others.4 
THE ARGUMENT 
Our purpose in this chapter is to examine the traditional argument of Ar-
istotle and Thomas. This argument is based on simple observations of 
the world around us. It looks at causal connections as a concurrent series 
and not one going back in time. It focuses on individual, actual se-
3See Richard Gale, "A New Argument for the Existence of God: One That Works, Sort Of," in 
17Je Rationality of 17Jeism, ed. Godehard Bruentrup and Ron Tacelli (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 
1999). 
-'A good example of Norman Geisler's treatment is his Philosopby of Religion (Grand Rapids: 
Zondervan, 1974). 
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quences and does not need to talk of the universe as a whole. Finally, 
its conclusion is simple, with a minimal conception of God, and leaves 
a fuller concept of God to subsequent conclusions. 
The briefest and most general statement of Thomas's argument is 
found in chapter fifteen of the Summa Contra Gentiles. It is also close 
to its predecessor in Aristotle. 
We see things in the world that can exist and can also not exist. Now ev-
erything that can exist has a cause. But one cannot go on ad i1?/initum in 
causes .... Therefore one must posit something the existing of which is 
necessary. (Summa Contra Gentiles 15.124, excerpts) 
There are three basic points in this argument. 
Premise 1: What we observe in this universe is contingent. This 
argument begins with a simple observation conceming the things we see 
andlmow about in the real world around us. It is not intended to be about 
evelything in the universe, let alone every possible entity, only those 
things we have actually observed. The key element in this first premise is 
the notion of contingency. In this context this means that something owes 
its existence to something else; it does not exist in and of itself. 
So these causal relations are transferring not initiating. That is, A is 
caused by B, but only as B is caused by C. Everything we know of pos-
sesses this sort of contingency: it exists and functions only as it is caused 
by other factors in its causal chain. We know of nothing that by itself 
spontaneously initiates causal activity. But note that nothing here tums 
on our knowing about evelything. Even if something does turn out to 
spontaneously initiate, it would have no effect on the CA. 
Premise 2: A sequence of causally related contingent things can-
not be infinite. The point of the second premise is to show that regard-
less of how complex and interconnected, and regardless of how exten-
sive they may be, the sequence of causally related contingent things is 
not infinite. Thomas at one point uses the picture of a hand moving a 
stick moving a ball. Perhaps the most frequently used analogy in recent 
discussions is the train. 
Imagine seeing a train moving past you for the first time. Baffled, you 
wonder how the boxcar is moving. You come to realize that it is being 
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pulled by another boxcar in front of it, and so on, and so on down the 
tracks. 
This allows us to visualize the various naturalistic scenarios, so com-
monly heard in our society, that describe how it is that things exist in 
the real world. "The cosmos is a great circle of being," we are told. But 
stringing boxcars all the way around in a circle until the last one hooks 
up to the first will still not explain the motion even of the first boxcar. 
And likewise, if contingent things cause each other to exist in a circle, 
there is no initiating of the causality. The naturalist offers another more 
promising scenario: "The cosmos is an intricately evolved ecosystem in 
which everything is related causally to everything else." So boxcars clut-
ter the world in an unimaginably complex system of railroads such that 
in some way evelY boxcar is coupled to and pulling the first one. We 
still have no accounting for the motion of that first boxcar and likewise 
for the existence of actual things. 
It is always tempting, of course, to say that it is just enough to know 
that the one in front of it is pulling each boxcar. In one sense it is clearly 
true that boxcar A is pulled by boxcar B. But B can pull A only because 
at the same time C is pulling B. The pulling action of B is transferred 
from C. And so it is also true that A is being pulled by C. The same is 
true, of course, about D, and about E, and so on. 
One last option suggests itself. Suppose that there are infinite boxcars, 
or as the naturalist says: "The intricacy of the universe is lost in infinite 
complexity." But infinite boxcars, no matter how complexly arranged, 
still leave unexplained why our first boxcar is moving and hence why 
any are. Letting the sequence go to infinity fails to explain anything. It 
just puts off infinitely the question of what initiates the causality. 
Premise 3: The sequence of causally dependent contingent things 
must be finite. The rest of the CA simply draws the obvious conclusion 
from premise 2. If the sequence cannot be infinite, then it must be finite. 
There is, of course, one other alternative, just as there is one way in 
which the line of boxcars can be infinite, namely, if they are not moving 
at all. There might of course be infinite boxcars in the train, but there 
could not be a moving train that consisted only of an infinity of boxcars. 
Just so, there might exist infinite things but not an infinite network of 
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concurrently causally dependent, contingent things. 
Conclusion: There must be a first cause in the sequence of con-
tingent causes. If the causal sequence is finite, then there is a first cause 
regardless of how many causes there might be in the series. This concept 
of "first cause" involves two component concepts. To say that it is the .first 
cause is to say that it neither requires nor has a cause itself. First is first! 
Thus it is fundamentally different from every other cause in the system: 
it is not contingent. It depends on, is limited by, or exists because of ab-
solutely nothing else. It does not pass on causality it receives in a trans-
ferring relation; rather it strictly initiates causality. It is itself uncaused. 
To say of the conclusion that it is tl1e first cause is to define its relation 
to evelytl1ing else in the sequence: namely, that it is their cause. It is the 
cause of all things in that it initiates all of the causal activity in the sequence, 
without negating tl1at each cause is, in fact, a cause in its own right of the 
following one in the sequence, and is an effect of the proceeding one. 
The only explanation for the moving line of boxcars is that some-
where there is a locomotive powerful enough to pull the whole train 
while itself not needing to be pulled. And so the concept of a first cause 
is richer than it might at first appear. It is the initiating cause of existence 
of everything in the series of causes and exists without any cause or de-
pendency whatsoever. It is strictly an uncaused cause. 
WHAT FOLLOWS ABOUT GOD'S NATURE? 
The fairly simple argument of Aristotle and Thomas gives us no more 
than a first cause. It does, however, set up a series of subsequent argu-
ments that fill in a good deal of content and provide a preface of some-
thing we are more justified in calling God. 
For the most part, these subarguments go back to Parmenides. He was 
something of an oddity in Greek philosophy by thinking that the uni-
verse is just one simple uncaused thing and not a network of casually 
connected things. It is precisely this notion that pushed him to ask what 
characteristics the universe must possess if it is in-and-of-itself or neces-
saly. But notice that this is exactly where the CA leaves us too. What fol-
lows from the fact that something is a first cause, that is, entirely without 
cause while causing all relevant effects? 
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Uniqueness. Why think that there is only one first cause? It seems to 
me that in fact many of the versions of the CA have been directed at pre-
cisely this goal. The obvious way to do it is to find a way to make the 
CA an argument about the entire universe, and the best way to do that 
is to incorporate some principle that includes all possible reality, for ex-
ample, the principle of sufficient reason. But this is not the tactic taken 
by Aristotle and Thomas. 
The subargument they use can be simplified like this. Imagine there 
are two first and uncaused causes. Call them FC1 and FC2. What is it that 
distinguishes them and hence determines that they are two, not one? 
What controls our thinking here is the logical principle that two things 
that do not differ in any respect at all are just the same thing. 
Put briefly, the only way FC2 could differ from FC1 would be for it to 
have some characteristic that FC1 does not. But if FC1 lacks something 
that is available (since FC2 has it) then it is limited or caused not to have 
it. But that is impossible since FC1 is not caused in any way. And so we 
have to conclude that any two-or more for that matter-uncaused first 
causes would have to be identical in the strict sense, and therefore there 
could only be one of them. 
Simplicity. That God is "simple" is a difficult but crucial concept. It 
means at least the following: (a) God has no parts and is therefore not 
material (made of measurable units); (b) God does not change, that is, 
he cannot add or subtract parts of what he is; (c) God is all one thing. 
There is not one part of him that is distinguishable from others. He sim-
ply is what he is. 
All of the meanings given to simplicity imply that God has parts, that 
is, that God has internal differences. The Bible sometimes seems to refer 
such things to God, just as we correctly do to human persons, such as 
changing his mind, or being somewhere (such as a burning bush) but 
not somewhere else. With some people he seems to act judgmentally. 
With others he is loving and forgiving. How are we to understand this? 
The argument here is a version of the argument for God's uniqueness. 
Any differences between parts would involve a lack of something in one 
of them. Such a lack would have to be a limit due to some cause, but 
that is impossible for an uncaused first cause. 
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These two arguments might seem abstract or irrelevant at first glance, 
but they play quite important roles in a larger conception of God. That 
there is only one God is crucial enough, and so is the point that God is 
what he is without change. Put together, these arguments form bound-
aries for the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. That is, there is only one 
God, not three, and he does not have internal divisions or parts. The bib-
lical data has to be compiled in a way that fits these logical boundaries. 
Peifection. An uncaused first cause, existing in and of itself, must 
therefore be perfect. This is simply the reverse of the argument used in 
the first two points above. If God has no limitations in what he is, then 
he is simply unlimited. 
The difficulty here is that we do not have any really positive meaning 
to this notion. When I say that I am 5'11" tall or that I am sitting at my 
desk, I am actually describing my limitations. My size is confined in cer-
tain ways, as is my presence in the room, as well as in the world. God, 
it turns out, must be described avoiding any limitations. Expressing that, 
however, can be accomplished only by consistently denying definitions 
of God. For example, God is not spatial. We say this by using the term 
omnipmsent. But that should not be taken to mean that God is located 
in evelY space. Rather, he is just not located in any sense. And this is to 
be applied to every description of God. Thus a seemingly empty term, 
applied to God, turns out to generate a great deal of important theology. 
We have come to call it "perfect being theology." 
Personhood We are still left with a rather abstract, nonrelational or, 
in general, nonpersonal being at best. Does anything follow from the CA 
that would indicate that God has personal characteristics? 
Both Aristotle and Thomas do have subarguments that God possesses 
knowledge and will. Aristotle's God, however, is nonrelational, knowing 
only himself. Thomas, however, shows that God's knowing of himself as 
first cause of all things does in fact involve a perfect knowing that is truly 
relational. 
I want, however, to mention here a simpler argument for personhood 
that flows from the CA. Among recent philosophers, it can be found in 
Norman Geisler's discussions. Put briefly, since the universe contains per-
sons who are rational, social, moral and free, how could the first cause of 
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all things be any less than a person? In particular, if the first cause is both 
uncaused and explains itself, then it must be free, not determined. 
There is much more to be said here as to what can be developed out 
of the CA. This, however, is enough to show that Thomas's simple argu-
ment does provide the basis for a fuller concept of God. 
SOME BASIC OBJECTIONS TO THE ARGUMENT 
During our discussion of the argument we have dealt with a number of 
problems, objections or alternate views. Here I want only to bring up 
two vety general objections to the CA. 
First, certainly the most frequent criticism of the CA is that there is no 
reason to think that it concludes to God. Even if it were a sound argu-
ment, the objection typically goes, it only gives us a first cause. This 
could well be some space/time factor, say, the big bang or elementaty 
particles of some sort, but not an infinite creator God who loves us and 
desires relationship and worship. 
Any response to this objection will first have to pose the question of 
what it takes to identify someone. Specifically, what characteristics do you 
have to know in order to identify someone? Clearly one answer is that you 
need only one, if it is a uniquely identifying characteristic. If only one ob-
ject in the universe has a specific property, and even if that is the only 
property I know, then I am able to correctly identify tl1at object. 
Given that principle, we should say that strictly speaking the minimal 
CA discussed above, by itself, does not uniquely identify God in its con-
clusion. However, that there must be finite links in every causal network 
and thus a first, uncaused cause is already enough to defeat most forms 
of atheistic naturalism which hold that the universe is a closed causal 
network. 
More important, of course, the CA has immediate implications that do 
provide unique identifiers. So a good strategy is to leave the argument 
as simple as possible rather than burden it with all sorts of complex pre-
mises that only demand additional, often difficult and only moderately 
probable premises. 
There are those who still object, including some Christian theists, that 
even with all the subarguments we are left with an abstract, impersonal 
A Tbomistic Cosmological Argument 105 
something that does not demand religious worship. The best response 
is to agree: the CA proves only what it proves. Certainly we will want 
more and different kinds of input, including revelation and experience. 
This further objection often supposes that unless we know evetything 
about God, we know nothing. But this is not only obviously false-I cer-
tainly know many things without knowing evetything about any of 
them-it is also self-contradictOlY since the objector clearly does not 
know evetything about the objection. I conclude that the argument 
yields a little but crucial and uniquely identifying knowledge of God. 
A second frequent objection makes the point that infinite series are pos-
sible. Since the CA depends on a denial of an infinite series of causes, the 
argument fails. It is, of course, tme that infinite series are possible. The 
sequence of cardinal numbers, as we all learned in elementaty school, is 
infinite. We could assign a cardinal number to each member of any causal 
sequence, and we would then have an infinite sequence of causes. 
This objection occurs in many forms, but they all overlook the specif-
ics of the sequence of causes in the CA. There are four characteristics of 
this series and each is cmcial to eliminating the possibility of infinity. (1) 
It is a sequence, a connected series of causes to effects. (2) Each cause 
is itself contingent. It, in turn, needs a cause. (3) The dependency in the 
Aristotelian/Thomistic CA is concurrent not chronological. It refers to 
concurrent dependency relations of cause and effect. (4) The specific re-
lation to which the generic CA refers is the causing of existence itself. 
The key point in the CA is that there cannot be an infinite series of 
causes with all four of the above characteristics, not that there cannot be 
infinite series of other types. 
Note that, given this point, it is irrelevant to the argument whether the 
universe itself might be infinite. Thomas thought that it is at least possi-
ble that the universe exists in infinite time, as Aristotle had held. That 
God created the beginning of time we know only by revelation. Many 
objections attempt to show that in some respects the universe is infinite, 
so the CA must be wrong. Attached to this is typically that Thomas's 
physics is just wrong. But this is all irrelevant to the CA. It shows only 
that there cannot be an infinite sequence of concurrent dependent 
causes of existence. 
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CONCLUSION: WHY Is THIS ARGUMENT IMPORTANT? 
It is clear that Thomas intended this argument to playa critical role in 
our understanding, not just of God and religion but, as it did for Aristotle, 
of everything. We cannot make sense of our reality at all apart from God. 
The God of the CA best explains life as we experience it. 
At the same time this argument is not a starting point. It is based on 
other arguments and observations, and so God is also a conclusion from 
the evidence. My point here is that one way in which the CA is important 
is that it demonstrates that God is not a belief or a creation of faith but 
part of our true description of things. So the CA is tremendously valuable 
for apologetics. 
This argument along with its subarguments is also vital in setting log-
ical guidelines for theology. We mentioned earlier how it helps us in re-
gard to the doctrine of the Trinity, but there are many other applications. 
The CA demands that God is unchanging. Applied to God as knowing, 
choosing, willing or acting in any way at all, we will have to see "un-
changingly" as a filter that always modifies our understanding of how 
God is to be conceptualized. If we extend this to all of the aspects of 
God's nature that are identified in the various subarguments of the CA 
and then apply them in turn to each of God's actions, we have built a 
framework for theology: a perfect being theology. 
Finally, the CA is important for us in doing science. It specifies the 
relationship between God's acting and the processes of science, includ-
ing the behaviors of human beings. It says that God is the true source-
the first cause-of all processes, evelY event and even evelY free action. 
We must note that this concept does not eliminate, replace or reduce the 
necessity of doing science. It is not a god-of-the-gaps view. It respects 
the proper place of science; in fact, it grounds science by explaining why 
it is even possible. 
This brings us back to the original question of how the universe op-
erates and the subsequent moves in philosophy that culminate in Aris-
totle's and Thomas's arguments. The CA can be seen as establishing or 
underwriting a worldview: a big-picture understanding of how evelY-
thing works-namely, theism, as opposed to naturalism. 
I have argued that cosmological thinking is important to our large un-
r 
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derstanding of evelything. There is much work yet to be done on the 
CA, and it may well be that faults will be found with our current ways 
of wording this argument. The objections that have been brought against 
it over virtually the entire history of both western and eastern philoso-
phy either fail or only point out the obvious limitations of the CA. It re-
mains an essential part of a Christian apologetic. 
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